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Prior to federal deposit insurance, bank
runs were a bit more commonplace. But
it is difficult to determine the extent to
which solvent banks became insolvent
following a run. Gary Gorton provides
some indirect evidence that suggests that
for bank runs during the U.S. National
Banking Era (1863–1914), depositors
were responding to a worsening of their
bank’s financial net worth, meaning that
depositors were probably running on
insolvent—and not solvent—banks. But
this evidence is inconclusive.
■ A Model of Bank Runs
Perhaps the most famous model of bank
runs is the one articulated by Douglas
Diamond and Philip Dybvig in 1983.
Their model, and variations of it, are the
closest thing that the profession has to a
consensus model of bank runs. Here, I
outline the basic intuition behind it.
An investor has $1 today. He can just
hold onto the $1 if he wants or he can
invest it in a long-term project and
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The need for federal deposit insur-
ance is often based on the claim that
it prevents bank runs and makes the
banking system more stable. But
research shows that banks could 
prevent bank runs by constructing
their deposit contracts appropriately,
and, in the absence of deposit insur-
ance, they would do so in their own
self interest. Federal deposit insur-
ance may be useful as insurance per
se—protecting depositors against
unforeseen accidents—but it should
not be considered necessary for 
banking system stability.
Government provision of deposit
insurance is often rationalized on the
grounds that it stabilizes the banking
system by removing the incentives for
depositors to engage in bank runs. Even
free market luminaries such as Milton
Friedman have credited federal deposit
insurance for the relative stability of the
United States’banking system after
World War II. The perception that
deposit insurance improves the stability
of the banking industry has been rein-
forced by a number of theoretical papers
on bank runs, including the seminal
work in this area by Douglas Diamond
and Philip Dybvig.
However, as illustrated by the 1980s
savings and loan debacle and more
recent regional banking problems in the
United States, deposit insurance is not a
panacea. By effectively eliminating bank
runs, deposit insurance has the unin-
tended effect of reducing market disci-
pline and increasing incentives for banks
to take on risk. While deposit insurance
may be effective in eliminating poten-
tially destabilizing bank runs, it is far
from clear that deposit insurance is the
best way to promote the stability of
banks and the banking system.
Despite the received wisdom that banks
are prone to instability, a careful review
of the economic literature on the topic
suggests otherwise. Recent theoretical
research, in particular, shows that banks
themselves can prevent bank runs by
modifying their demand deposit con-
tracts. It turns out that in the absence of
deposit insurance, banks will try to pro-
tect themselves from being the victim of
bank runs by choosing an appropriate
financial structure. In the end, it is diffi-
cult to tell a coherent story in which
banks are inherently unstable.
■ Bank Runs
A bank run occurs when depositors
believe that their bank will be unable to
honor all of its deposit liabilities; deposi-
tors rush to the bank and attempt to 
withdraw as much of their money as
they can, in order to avoid losing all or
most of it. Given that a bank holds only 
a small fraction of its assets in the form
of cash, a bank run can be disruptive
because the bank will have to liquidate
its noncash assets in order to meet the
demands of its depositors. 
In spite of these disruption costs, in
some circumstances a bank run may not
be such a bad thing. If a bank is insol-
vent, then, from society’s point of view,
it is optimal that the bank be dissolved,
and the sooner the better. A bank run can
send a very visible signal that something
may be wrong; if the bank is indeed
insolvent, a run may be an expedient
way to bring about the optimal dissolu-
tion. But if the depositors’beliefs are
incorrect and the bank is actually solvent
prior to the bank run, then a bank run
would be a very bad thing if it resulted in
a solvent bank becoming insolvent. 
How susceptible are banks in general to
runs of the sort that turn solvent banks
into insolvent ones? This is actually a
hard question to answer. Although we
have seen very few bank runs since the
Great Depression—which might lead
one to conclude that the banking sector
is stable—federal deposit insurance,
which came into existence during the
Great Depression, may explain this. If
depositors understand that their deposits
are guaranteed to pay off up to some
maximum amount (which today is
$100,000), they will have little or no
incentive to ever run on a bank. receive, say, $1.20 at a future date. The
long-term investment project can always
be liquidated at an earlier date. The
model assumes for simplicity that if an
investor liquidates his long-term invest-
ment project early, he will get back the
dollar that he originally invested. The
basic insights from the analysis do not
depend on this assumption, and this
assumption can be interpreted as saying
that financial markets do a good job of
converting relatively illiquid invest-
ments into liquid assets. At the time
when the investor must decide what to
do with his dollar—invest it or not—he
does not know whether he will be impa-
tient, meaning that he prefers to spend
and consume at an early date, or patient,
meaning that he prefers to spend and
consume at a late date. Suppose that the
investor believes there is a 50-50 chance
that he will be impatient. What is his
optimal investment and spending strat-
egy? First of all, the individual investor
will always invest in the long-term pro-
ject. If he turns out to be impatient, and
this happens with a 50 percent probabil-
ity, he will liquidate the long-term
investment and buy $1.00 worth of
goods at the early date; if he turns out to
be patient, he will liquidate his project
at the late date and buy $1.20 worth of
goods at that time.
The first thing that can be shown with
the Diamond and Dybvig model is that
banks are useful in that they can achieve
better outcomes for investors than
investors can get by acting in isolation
of one another. For example, investors
don’t like risk; specifically, they prefer
outcomes that produce less variation in
their income or consumption. Banks can
provide a smoother spending profile for
an investor—in this case, something
smoother than a choice between $1.00
at the early date or $1.20 at the late date.
Let a bank enter the scene and assume
that there are many investors with a dol-
lar to invest. A bank will take deposits,
promising its depositors withdrawal
possibilities—either for the early or late
date. Mirroring what happens at the
individual level, suppose in this econ-
omy that half of the investors turn out to
be impatient and the other half patient;
there is no economywide risk in the
sense that there is no uncertainty regard-
ing the proportion of investors that will
be impatient or patient. 
It is possible for the bank to improve
upon the investor’s optimal strategy.
Suppose that the bank receives $1.00
from each investor and invests the total
proceeds in the long-term investment
project. In return, the bank promises to
give $1.05 to anyone who wants to make
a withdrawal at the early date or $1.14 to
anyone who wants to make a withdrawal
at the late date. Note that half of the
investors will be impatient and will want
to have money at the early date. In order
to pay these people off, the bank must
liquidate 52.5 percent of the long-term
investment, i.e., 0.525/0.5 = 1.05. Hence,
48.5 percent of the original long-term
investment remains intact, and the pro-
ceeds of the investment can be shared by
the remaining 50 percent of the investors
at the late date, i.e., (0.475 x 1.20)/0.5 =
1.14. The bank’s deposit contract of
promising $1.05 early or $1.14 late—
which I will compactly represent by
(1.05, 1.14)—is “smoother” than an
investor’s payoff if he does not use a
bank. If investors really don’t like risk,
then they will prefer the deposit contract
(1.05, 1.14) to the payoff (1, 1.20) that
they can get for themselves. 
It appears that investors are better off in a
world where there is a bank. As well, it
appears as if the bank will be solvent in
the sense that it is able to pay off all of
its obligations: The deposit contract is
designed to be able to pay off half of the
depositors at the early date and the
remaining half at the late date.
■ Bank Runs and Suspensions
Unfortunately, impatient investors
choosing to withdraw $1.05 at the early
date and patient players waiting to with-
draw $1.14 at the late date is but only
one possible outcome in this banking
scenario. To see this, suppose that after
investors give their $1.00 to the bank in
exchange for the deposit contract (1.05,
1.14), each investor comes to believe (for
some reason) that all other investors are
going to make an early withdrawal. And
this is independent of whether investors
are patient or impatient. When an
investor believes that all other investors
are going to make an early withdrawal
from the bank, then his best response is
also to make an early withdrawal even if
he is patient. The reasoning is straight-
forward: If all other investors attempt to
make an early withdrawal, the bank will
be unable to pay off everyone because
the total liquidation value of the long-
term investment can only guarantee a
payoff of $1.00 for each investor. But
$1.05 is promised. If investors queue up
at the bank and the bank pays off
investors on a first-come-first-served
basis, then those investors who are lined
up near the end of the line will receive
nothing. Obviously, in this scenario the
bank will be unable to make any kind of
payoff at the later date. Hence, a patient
investor who understands all this will
want to make an early withdrawal
because a 95 percent chance of getting
$1.05 at the early date is better than a 
100 percent chance of receiving nothing
at the later date. 
This scenario makes the bank look as if
it is unstable: At the time investments
are undertaken and deposit contracts are
negotiated, the bank is solvent—that is,
the bank is expecting to pay off half of
its depositors early and the other half
later. But when the unanticipated bank
run occurs, the bank becomes insolvent.
It turns out that in this simple example, a
bank run can be prevented if the bank
offers a better deposit contract to
investors. By offering the deposit con-
tract (1.05, 1.14) the bank effectively
invites a run to happen if the depositors
(for some reason) come to believe that
all other depositors are going to make an
early withdrawal. 
Suppose that in addition to the payoff
(1.05, 1.14), the bank’s deposit contract
also stipulates that the bank will “sus-
pend payments” at the early date after it
pays out 52.5 percent of the liquidated
value of its original investment. With
this added stipulation, can a bank run
occur? Once again, suppose that
investors come to believe that all other
investors will attempt to make an early
withdrawal. What is the optimal
response for a patient investor? Unlike
the first scenario, the patient investor
will not make a run for the bank. The
reason is clear. Because the bank sus-
pends payments after it liquidates a cer-
tain fraction of the original investment,
it essentially guarantees that any
(patient) investor who waits until the
late date to make a withdrawal will
receive $1.14 for sure. Knowing this, the
patient investor has no incentive to make
a run on the bank at the early date
because the patient investor prefers
receiving $1.14 at the late date as
opposed to $1.05 at the early date. So, at
least in this simple example, if banks
design their deposits contracts in an
appropriate way, they can prevent bank
runs from occurring.10 percent chance that an investor will
be impatient and there is no economy-
wide risk, then it is feasible for a bank to
offer the deposit contract (1.15, 1.18),
along with a suspension rule that only
10 percent of the original investment
will be liquidated at the early date. The
point here is that if only 10 percent of
the investors turn out to be impatient, as
opposed to 50 percent in previous exam-
ple, the payoff to an impatient investor
will increase. Recall that when there
was a 50-50 chance of an investor being
impatient, the best deposit contract was
(1.05, 1.14): Hence, as the proportion of
impatient investors increases, their pay-
offs will decrease. 
Using the insight that the payoffs to
investors will decrease as the proportion
of impatient investors increases, when
there is economywide risk—meaning
that we do not know how many impa-
tient investors there will be—the opti-
mal deposit contract will be character-
ized by the first impatient investor who
wants to withdraw early receiving more
than the second impatient investor, who
receives more than the third impatient
investor, and so on. That is, as the pro-
portion of impatient investors increases,
their individual payoffs will decrease
and, hence, the optimal deposit contract
is characterized by a declining payout to
impatient investors. 
This deposit contract will also have two
rather important features. First, the
deposit contract must be feasible: Since
it may be the case that all investors turn
out to be impatient—although this event
may be unlikely—the deposit contract
must ensure that if everyone shows up at
the bank at the early date to make a
withdrawal, everyone will receive the
appropriate payoff when all of the
investment is liquidated. And second,
the deposit contract must be incentive
compatible: The levels of the deposit
payoffs for early withdrawals will be
such that patient investors will prefer to
wait to withdraw at the later date rather
than line up and make an early with-
drawal. For the kind of economywide
risk that we have described, this deposit
contract will not invite a bank run. The
bank will always be able to offer a pay-
off to investors who withdraw late
because the bank contract is feasible;
the patient investor does not have to
worry about the bank not having any
resources at the late date. Even if a
patient investor arrives early—perhaps
anticipating a bank run—he will always
prefer not to make a withdrawal at that
time, but rather wait until later, because
the bank contract is incentive compati-
ble. This kind of deposit contract has
been called a “partial suspension” con-
tract because the payoff to a with-
drawer at the early date is suspended in
favor of a lower payoff for any subse-
quent early-date withdrawers. 
■ Deposit Insurance
It appears that the banking sector will
be stable if banks offer deposit con-
tracts that permit them to either totally
or partially suspend payments to depos-
itors. The reader, however, should not
take the contracts described above too
literally. What the reader should take
away is that if banks understand that
depositors may, for some reason,
attempt to make a run on a solvent
bank, then they (the banks) can offer
contracts with features that prevent
bank runs occurring in the first place. 
The fact that banks are able to protect
themselves against bank runs does not
imply that deposit insurance is without
value. The pure insurance aspect of
deposit insurance clearly has social
value. Just as people find it valuable to
purchase home insurance to protect
themselves against an accident, deposit
insurance provides the same benefit to
depositors. That is, a depositor’s bank
may suffer an adverse shock that would
diminish the value of existing deposit
accounts; deposit insurance protects
deposit holders against such an accident. 
■ Recommended Reading
Douglas Diamond, and Philip Dybvig.
(1983). “Bank Runs, Deposit Insur-
ance, and Liquidity,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 91, 401–19.
In practice, banks have suspended 
payments to their depositors. In the
National Banking Era, banks would at
times suspend conversion of their 
banknotes into specie (gold) if they
were expecting a destabilizing run to
occur. After a while, these suspensions
lifted, and banks would once again 
convert their banknotes into specie. In
Scotland, bankers had option clauses
embedded in their banknotes, which
gave bankers the option of not convert-
ing their banknotes into specie over a
specific period of time. This option was
viewed as a protective measure against
bank runs.
■ Partial Suspensions
Perhaps the above example is too sim-
ple because it was constructed so that
there is no economywide risk. I can
introduce economywide risk by assum-
ing that the probability that one investor
is impatient, which is equal to 0.5, is
independent of the probability that any
other investor will be patient. So, for
example, if there are 10 investors in the
world, then there is a positive probabil-
ity that there can be 1, 2, and all the
way up to 10 investors who are impa-
tient. In this example, the probability
that there is exactly one impatient
investor is equal to 0.510. Unlike the
previous example, when there was no
economywide risk, the bank does not
know at the time that it collects money
from investors and issues deposit con-
tracts exactly how many investors will
be patient and how many will be impa-
tient. Therefore, it may not be a good
idea for the bank to offer the deposit
contract (1.05, 1.14) with a suspension
clause, as above, since the suspension
might kick in when there still are impa-
tient investors who need funds for
spending. But without a suspension
clause, a deposit contract, like the one
described in the above example, is
always subject to a bank run. Does this
imply that banks are unstable when
there is economywide risk?
Just as in the case when there was no
economywide risk, when a bank effi-
ciently uses all information at its dis-
posal, it can design a deposit contract
that prevents bank runs from occurring.
Although the deposit contract when
there is economywide risk is a bit com-
plicated, the intuition behind it is
straightforward. In previous examples I
assumed that there was a 50-50 chance
that an investor would be impatient. If 
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